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THE NINTH AMENDMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS,




Long ignored by the courts as well as by legal and political scholars, the
ninth amendment to the United States Constitution has recently attracted
considerable attention in the federal courts. The source of this new focus on
the ninth amendment is found in Justice Douglas' majority and Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut. I The new promi-
nence of the ninth amendment is illustrated by examining Shepard's Cita-
tions. Prior to Griswold, the number of federal court citations to the ninth
amendment was less than 100. In the fifteen years after Griswold, the
number of citations to the ninth amendment exceeded 400. Despite the phe-
nomenal increase in reliance on the ninth amendment in litigation, the legal
and political literature does not demonstrate any serious interest in exploring
the nature, outcome, or consequences of such reliance.
Only two law review articles offer insight into this concern. In 1972,
A.F. Ringold reviewed the Griswold ninth amendment legacy in federal court
cases. 2 He concluded that the "current success ratio for asserted ninth
amendment rights has been so phenomenally large that an attorney would
almost be derelict if [s]he did not at least include" the ninth amendment in
her or his claim. 3 Lyman Rhoades and Rodney Patula, who examined fed-
eral court cases decided during roughly the same period, were less enthusias-
tic. 4 They concluded that the federal courts exhibited a "reluctance" to use
the ninth amendment. 5 Neither article contains a comprehensive analysis of
the federal courts' application of the ninth amendment. Each article offers
* B.A., Eastern Illinois University; M.A., Ph.D., Southern Illinois University at Carbon-
dale. The author is indebted to Professor Randall Nelson of Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale for his extensive advice and guidance in the writing of his doctoral thesis, from
which the research and inspiration for this article originates.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold involved a criminal prosecution for advising married
persons on the use of contraceptives. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions. Justice
Douglas' majority opinion was based on the existence of a zone of privacy for married couples in
matters of contraception and marital privacy. This was formed by emanations from the first,
third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. Justice Douglas did not expound on the
future implications of the ninth amendment in litigation. However, Justice Goldberg's concur-
rence advances the proposition that the ninth amendment is a source of unenumerated rights
not located in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, so long as the ninth amendment claim is
grounded in a liberty interest.
2. Ringold, The Hirtoqv of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and As Recent Development, 8
TULSA L.J. 1 (1972).
3. Id. at 36.
4. Rhoades and Patula, The Ninth Amendment- A Survey of Theory and Practice in ihe Federal
Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DEN. L.J. 153 (1973).
5. Id. at 163-67.
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only a glimpse of the disposition of a group of ninth amendment claims,
some of which the courts resolved on grounds other than the merits of the
ninth amendment. Rhoades and Patula reviewed claims made under the
ninth amendment for the right to teach sex education,6 the right to demon-
strate,7 and for the rights of prisoners. In each instance, however, the ninth
amendment claim was not considered by the courts, as Rhoades and Patula
note. For example, questions regarding sex education and public demon-
stration were decided on first amendment grounds, while the prisoner rights
case was decided on the failure to show a violation under the eighth and
fourteenth amendment. The court summarily dismissed or failed to address
the ninth amendment claim in each instance.8
In the years since Ringold's, and Rhoades and Patula's articles, no ex-
amination of ninth amendment cases has been published in either the legal
or the political science literature. Some effort is necessary to: 1) reexamine
the cases covered by Ringold, and Rhoades and Patula, 2) to examine the
period through 1979, and 3) to discuss the relevant Supreme Court cases
decided after Griswold.9 The central focus of this article is directed at deter-
mining what rights are accorded constitutional protection via the ninth
amendment in the federal courts.
I. A SURVEY OF NINTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS
A. The Ninth Amendment in the Supreme Court
After Griswold, only seven majority opinions in the cases decided refer to
the ninth amendment.' 0 Not one of these uses the ninth amendment as a
constitutional source for protecting unenumerated rights. In each the Court
6. Manfredonia v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. People v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I.), rev'don other grounds, 468 F. 2d 1143 (1st
Cir. 1972).
8. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971); Burns v. Swenson, 430
F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Negrich v. Hohn,
246 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aft'd, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
9. Only majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals,
and the District Courts are included in the analysis of this inquiry. Shepard's Citations and
LEXIS were used to identify those cases in which the ninth amendment is cited. Only those
cases decided during the period commencing with June 7, 1965, through December 31, 1979,
were considered for relevancy, as defined below. Approximately 560 federal court citations
were generated through the two legal indexes. Court opinions in which the ninth amendment is
cited, but which are not included in this inquiry, include those in which the court disposed of
the case for one of the following reasons: 1) on the basis of statutory construction, without
reaching the constitutional claims, and 2) on procedural questions, e.g., standing, jurisdiction,
abstention. In addition, this inquiry does not include those cases in which the issue of the ninth
amendment, as opposed to the case as a whole, was disposed of by one of the following reasons:
1) the court states that the claim asserted under the ninth amendment is a question arising
under some other constitutional provision and will, therefore, be treated as such, 2) the court
notes that there is no need to consider the ninth amendment claim because its decision concern-
ing other constitutional claims effectively disposes of the case, and 3) the court notes that the
merits of the ninth amendment claim are not considered because plaintiff, or appellant, empha-
sized some other constitutional provision and failed to address the ninth amendment claim.
10. Selection of Supreme Court opinions differed from the selection process for the Courts
of Appeals and the District Courts. All majority opinions which could conceivably be inter-
preted as bearing on the Court's predilections towards the ninth amendment have been in-
cluded for consideration. Those majority opinions in which the ninth amendment is cited solely
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declined the opportunity to explicitly accept or to reject the ninth amend-
ment as a source of authority for identifying unenumerated rights. Justice
Douglas' and Justice Goldberg's ninth amendment contributions in Griswold,
however, have not been modified, limited or overruled. Since subsequent
discussions of the ninth amendment have been extremely terse, efforts to
identify acceptance of their views on ninth amendment protection for
unenumerated rights would involve a speculative process of surmise. A re-
view of these decisions shows the cursory manner in which the Supreme
Court has dealt with ninth amendment questions.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond" I involved objections to certain
questions on the New York State Bar application. Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, identified and then summarily dismissed the appellant's ninth
amendment claims.12 In response to a privacy claim, Justice Stewart stated:
"We think it borders on the frivolous to say that such an inquiry offends the
applicant's right to privacy by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 13 Thereafter, Justice Stewart addressed the substance of ap-
pellant's claims and ignored the constitutional source of the right to privacy.
Justice White gave a ninth amendment claim similar treatment in the
majority opinion in CiilService Commission v. Letter Carriers. 14 Without specif-
ically addressing the relevance of the ninth amendment, Justice White im-
plicitly rejected any ninth amendment bar to Hatch Act' 5 restrictions on
political activities of civil service employees: "Our judgment is that neither
the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a
law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees."'
16
The Supreme Court denied ninth amendment privacy claims in two
abortion cases, Roe v. Wade 17 and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth .l
Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in Roe that:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy,' 9
Yet, Blackmun's silences are more interesting than his affirmative state-
to identify the constitutional claims are not included, nor are concurring or dissenting opinions
in which the ninth amendment is discussed or cited.
11. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
12. The Law Students Research Council argued that certain questions included in the
"third-party affidavits attesting to an applicant's good moral character" violated the applicant's
right to privacy. One question objected to was whether the affiant visited the applicant's home.
Id. at 160.
13. Id.
14. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
16. 413 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added). The National Association of Letter Carriers sought
to have the Hatch Act's "prohibition against active participation in political management or
political campaigns with respect to certain defined activity" declared unconstitutional. For a
description of the prohibited activities in which the Union sought to partake, see id. at 551 n.3.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
19. 410 U.S. at 153 (cited with approval in 428 U.S. at 60).
19831
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ments. Blackmun neither avers nor denies that the ninth amendment is an
adequate source of constitutional restraint. Moreover, Blackmun does not
suggest that the lower court erred by relying on the ninth amendment. Per-
haps Blackmun's silence was in deference to the discretion of the lower court.
Or possibly he intimated that it was inconsequential whether either the
ninth amendment, or the liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment,
was relied on, or even whether both were relied on, in a case. Thus, Black-
mun might have unintentionally advanced the use of the ninth amendment
as constitutional authority to protect an unenumerated, fundamental right.
However, in Whalen v. Roe 2° Justice Stevens dispelled any speculation that
Blackmun's statement constituted an implicit acceptance of the ninth
amendment as the source of the right to privacy. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Stevens noted that the decision in Roe v. Wade rested on the personal
liberty concept of the fourteenth amendment, and not on the ninth
amendment .21
The ninth amendment was treated more graciously in Stanley v. I"-
nois, 22 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland.23 In both cases the Court used the
liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to strike down the chal-
lenged laws. Justice White in Stanley and Justice Powell in Moore, however,
look to seize upon Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold, for authority
to infuse the claims in these cases with constitutionl protection.
24
In short, the later Supreme Court opinions reflect tolerance; certainly
there is no hearty embrace of the ninth amendment as a constitutional
source for the right of privacy which Griswold generated. Although the
Court has approved of Douglas' and Goldberg's general theories, there has
been no disposition to rely on the ninth amendment as interpreted in
Griswold.25
B. The Ninth Amendment in the Courts of Appeal
A group of twenty-seven representative Court of Appeals opinions
26
20. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
21. Id. at 598 n.23. Whalen involved a privacy challenge against a New York record keep-
ing system. The law required that the names and addresses of all persons who obtained, pursu-
ant to a doctor's prescription, certain drugs, be stored in a centralized computer file. Although
the plaintiff relied, in part, on the ninth amendment, Justice Stevens did not address that claim
at length, his opinion emphasized that the right of privacy was protected by the liberty concept
of the fourteenth amendment.
22. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Stanley involved a challenge to an Illinois state law which pro-
vided for taking an illegitimate child from the father at the time of the mother's death without a
hearing as to the father's fitness. Justice White notes that the right at issue is the "private
interest . . . of a man in the children he has sired and raised." Id. at 651.
23. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Moore involved an attack on a city ordinance limiting the occu-
pancy of dwelling units to a single family. The ordinance defined "family" in such a manner as
to prohibit appellant from housing two of her grandsons, who were first cousins, in her home.
24. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland 431 U.S. at
503 n.12, respectively.
25. The Supreme Court's most recent abortion decision, City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive llealth, Inc. 51 U.S.L.W, 4767 (U.S. June 15, 1983), reinforces the Court's pat-
tern of express reliance on the fourteenth amendment for constitutional protection for freedom
of choice in marital and familial matters. Id at 4770.
26. For an explanation of the method used to develop the sample of cases, see note 9 supra.
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were considered in this inquiry. Only four of these cases, however, suggest
that the courts accepted constitutional claims based at least in part on the
ninth amendment. The rights upheld in these cases include the right of pub-
lic school students to control their personal appearance in spite of high
school grooming codes, 27 the right of a woman to choose an abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy without the imposition of state restrictions,28
and the right of parents to rear their children without the state unreasonably
taking the youngster's life. 29 An additional seven opinions exhibit acquies-
cence in the notion that the ninth amendment does protect unenumerated
rights. In these cases, however, the courts refused to extend protection to the
rights asserted. Generally, this refusal was based on a finding that the
claimed right was not within the original notion of privacy enunciated in
Grswold.
Three separate challenges to public grooming regulations were rejected
on the basis that the right to publicly wear one's hair in the style of one's
choosing was not a right protected by the Griswold marital-familial right of
privacy. 30 A request to extend ninth amendment protection to an inmate
incarcerated in a penal institution was declined by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Burns v. Sioerson.3 ' Other rights which were asserted
27. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Note that Judge Myron Bright, in his opinion for the
court in Bishop, cited the opinion in Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) for reliance
on the ninth and fourteenth amendments to uphold a claim to a similar right. 450 F.2d at 1071.
While the court's opinion in Crews contains no mention of the ninth amendment, Crews states
one's choice in hair style is an element of personal freedom protected by the Constitution. See
Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036, for authority that the ninth amendment is a possible source for such
protection. Crews, 432 F.2d at 1203, cites Griswold without mentioning the ninth amendment
for certain "additional fundamental rights" existing alongside those enumerated in the first
eight amendments.
28. Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 447 U.S.
918 (1980) (no discussion of ninth amendment). Examples of requirements set by the regulation
include: that anesthesia be administered by an anesthesiologist; that nursing personnel must be
supervised and directed by a registered nurse who has post-graduate education or experience in
obstetric or gynecological nursing. The clinic was also required to have various "expensive and
elaborate equipment." Id. at 458.
29. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (no discus-
sion of ninth amendment). Mattis's eighteen year old son, Michael, and a friend had broken
into a golf course office to steal money. When the police arrived, the youths attempted to flee.
One of the police officers gave chase after Michael. When the officer realized that he could not
keep up, he ordered Michael to halt, which Michael refused to do. The officer then fired what
he thought was "well above" Michael, but struck Michael in the head. The court of appeals
held that the father had a constitutional right to "raise his son," and could, therefore, challenge
the validity of the shooting for the purpose of seeking declaratory relief. d. at 595.
30. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); Freeman v. Falke, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1970). Not included in this inquiry, but of some interest, are two court of appeals opinions
in which the judges relied on Karr orJackon, but did not mention the ninth amendment. In
Sherling v. Townley, 464 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1972), decided shortly after Kar, the court stated it
felt bound by the holding in Kar. (But note Judge Tuttle's concurring opinion, in which he
expresses agreement with the dissenting judges in Karr). In Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444,
446 (6th Cir. 1971), the court reaffirmed the "principles of"Jackson.
31. 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). The exact nature of the
ninth amendment claim is not clear from a reading of the court's opinion. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's holding that the isolated detention in maximum security to which
the inmate was committed violated the prisoner's due process rights. On appeal Bums argued
1983]
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but found to be without ninth amendment protection include the asserted
right of a husband to stay with his wife in a public hospital's delivery
room,32 an individual's right to possess an unregistered submachine gun, 33 a
postal patron's right to be free from mail covers by the United States Bureau
of Customs,3 4 and Florida state legislators' right to be free from compelled
disclosure of certain personal financial information.
35
In the remaining sixteen cases, the Courts of Appeals disposed of claims,
based in part on the ninth amendment, by concluding that the government
possessed the constitutional authority to engage in the challenged activity.
In these cases the courts did not explicitly reject the proposition that the
ninth amendment may be invoked for asserting an unenumerated right.
The courts ruled against challenges to induction orders,3 6 the "equal time"
provision of the "Fairness Doctrine" for broadcasters,37 the manner of con-
gressional representation in the District of Columbia,38 a deportation order
issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 39 subpoenas issued
that, iter a/ta, the district court's order to expunge his record of the detention was supported by
the ninth amendment. Id. at 778.
32. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 916 (1976).
33. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
34. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 181 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
The Bureau of Customs had arranged with the United States Postal Inspector to obtain ad-
dresses from the face of the envelopes addressed to Choate for the purpose of locating a source of
narcotics in South America.
35. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
The disclosure was mandated by an amendment to the Florida Constitution, which required
elected and other public officials and employees to file a public statement detailing their assets
and liabilities over $1,000.
36. United States v. Murray, 452 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 935 (1972);
United States v. Sowul, 447 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972); United
States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Farrell, 443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971); United States v. Uhl, 436 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Diaz, 427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970). Appellants challenged their induction orders on
such grounds as: the induction unconstitutionally interfered with the "right to life" (Diaz, 427
F.2d at 639), that the Selective Service law was unconstitutional during a period in which there
was no "dire emergency" (Uhl, 436 F.2d at 774), or that one is exempt from military service
because of one's "religious scruples under the First and Ninth Amendments" (Murray, 452 F.2d
at 504). The courts rejected these challenges on the ground that the Congress has the power to
conscript individuals into the armed forces.
37. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), a d, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (no discussion of ninth amendment). Red Lion Broadcasting argued that the "equal
time" provision of the FCC mandated by the "fairness in broadcasting" doctrine constituted a
prior restraint and, therefore, deprived them of their political rights retained by the ninth
amendment. Id. at 925.
38. Breakefield v. District of Columbia, 442 F.2d 1227, 1228-29, 1228 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971); Carliner v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1968) cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
39. Cervantes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 510 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1975).
Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes were in the United States illegally. The husband had exceeded the six
month temporary stay originally granted by the Department of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. In addition, he moved to Kansas for employment without informing the Depart-
ment of his move. His fiancee entered the country illegally from Mexico, and joined him in
New York where they were married and continued to live. During this period, they had a child.
The couple filed suit in the court of appeals arguing that their son, an American minor, had a
ninth amendment right "to continue to have the love and affection of his parents in the United
States." Id. at 91.
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by federal grand juries, 4° and an army reservist grooming code. 4' Other
failed challenges include an effort to avoid an Internal Revenue summons,
42
and a claim by a school board that a "freedom of choice" school placement
policy was justified by the ninth amendment. 43 Finally, in Mapco Inc. v.
Carter,4 4 an Emergency Court of Appeals rejected an oil company's conten-
tion that it had a ninth amendment right "to trust the federal government
and rely on the integrity of its pronouncements.
45
In general, the Courts of Appeals have restricted ninth amendment pro-
tection to the right of privacy in Griswold. When the claim asserted under
the ninth amendment was too broad, several courts expressed the view that
only those rights specified in Griswold, such as the right to privacy of the
home, the general rights of family and procreation, and the right to marital
privacy, were protected through the ninth amendment. However, some
cases did begin to expand the limits. A broader conceptual framework was
offered in Plante v. Gonzalez,46 which limited the right to privacy to those
situations involving personal autonomy and confidentiality. In Breen v.
Kahl,4 7 the court of appeals upheld the right to choose one's hair style, be-
cause the issue was one of personal freedom; the judgment in Mathts v.
Schnarr4 8 found that a father had a right to rear his son based on the right to
raise a family, a right implicitly recognized in Griswold; and, the court's judg-
ment in Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter4 9 rested upon the determination
that a woman's right to have an abortion during the first trimester of preg-
nancy involved the constitutionally protected area of a woman's autonomy.
The unwillingness to extend the Griswold concept of the ninth amend-
40. In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 730 (7th Cir. 1976).
41. Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 865 (1971). While in
the Army Reserves, Anderson had a number of unexcused absences from obligatory meetings.
Although he attended the meetings, he was recorded as absent because his hair length violated
army grooming codes. As a result, Anderson was ordered to active duty. His attempt to reverse
the induction order by challenging the army's grooming code was rebuffed by Judge Wilbur
Pell, Jr. Judge Pell reasoned that if Anderson "were completely in civilian status, his position
would have legally persuasive stature." But, Judge Pell concluded, the rights of individuals in
the armed forces are balanced against compelling governmental interests, and that "it is not for
civil courts to judge whether the military has properly determined the balance between military
needs and personal rights." Id. at 914.
42. United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th Cir. 1976),cert. dened, 431 U.S. 919
(1977).
43. United States v. School Board of Franklin City, 428 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1970). School
Board of Frankhin 0'y consists of three cases consolidated into one. The ninth amendment claim
was made in Covington v. United States, id.
44. 573 F.2d 1268 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. dented, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
45. Id. at 1273. Mapco sought to enjoin implementation of a "rollback" of prices of "up-
per-tier" domestic crude oil, arguing that the establishment of the two-tier pricing system was
devised and pronounced by the federal government for the purpose of providing oil companies
with incentive to increase domestic drilling and development. Consequently, Mapco main-
tained, it had a ninth amendment right to the "expectation that the maximum prices of upper-
tier oil would never be regulated or reduced by the federal government." Id. at 1280.
46. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denzed, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
48. 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (no discussion of the ninth
amendment). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
49. 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 447 U.S. 918 (1980) (no discussion of the ninth
amendment). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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ment is also evident in those decisions where the court determined that the
right asserted was foreclosed because the government had constitutionally
derived power to control that area. None of the cases that were disposed of
on this basis involve a right similar, either in nature or in circumstance, to
those specified earlier by the courts as appropriate for ninth amendment
protection.
Of the cases outlined, the only real conflict pits the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits against the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. While the former hold
that an individual's choice of hair style is not a fundamental right under the
ninth amendment, the latter two circuits conclude otherwise. 50
C. The Ninth Amendment in the Distrzct Courts
A representative group of fifty-seven district court decisions were gath-
ered for this discussion. Twenty-seven decisions of these relevant cases held
that the rights asserted were protected, at least in part, by the ninth amend-
ment. Of these, eighteen involved matters of personal decisions; it was
claimed in most cases that the consequences of these decisions were confined
to the individual making the decision. This category includes suits brought
by military reservists who wanted to wear wigs during training,5 ' challenges
by public high school students to school grooming codes, 52 an individual's
claimed right to obtain obscene material,53 challenges to state abortion regu-
lations, 54 and the asserted individual right to use "a nontoxic substance [in
50. Note that the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question of the
constitutionality of a public school's grooming code. The Court, however, examined a police
department's grooming code in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). Justice Rehnquist
wrote that the regulations involved in Kelley did not violate any substantive rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. Rehnquist argued that for that case's purpose, it was "as-
sume[d]" that "the citizenry at large has some sort of 'liberty' interest within the Fourteenth
Amendment in matters of personal appearance ..... Id. at 244. However, the "claim of a
member of a civilian service based on the 'liberty' interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must [not] necessarily be treated for constitutional purposes the same as a similar claim by
a member of the general public." Id. at 249.
51. Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1973); Brown v. Schlesinger, 365
F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973).
52. Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. I11. 1973); Watson v. Thompson, 321 F.
Supp. 394 (E.D. Tex. 1971), vacated, 458 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1972); Berryman v. Hein 329 F.
Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Black v.
Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb.
1970); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970).
53. United States v. Orito, 338 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 413 U.S. 139 (1973);
United States v. B & H Distrib. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S.
927 (1971), affdon othergrowzds, 347 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Wis. 1972),vacated, 413 U.S. 909 (1973),
acq. 375 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Wis. 1974). The original opinions in Onto and B &H rely princi-
pally on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 566 (1968), for the proposition that the first amendment
protects the right to read obscene material in the privacy of one's home. While the judges in
Ont0o and B &H argued that the right to obtain such material was also protected, the Supreme
Court rejected this, citing" U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 35, (1971); and United States v. Thirty
Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
54. Doe v. Mundy, 378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aftd, 514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975);
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), vacated 410 U.S. 950 (1972); YWCA v.
Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D. N.J. 1972) af'd mem., 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Abele v.
Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F.
Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), modif*don othergrounds, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
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this case the drug Laetrile] in connection with one's personal health care."'55
Five cases concern claims involving interpersonal relationships of a formal
familial or informal associational nature. The issues in these cases include a
challenge to a Merchant Marine Academy's regulation prohibiting its cadets
from marrying,56 the claimed rights of a parent and minor child to attend a
lecture on contraception, 57 and the asserted right of a parent to protect her
child from state distribution of contraceptive information. 58 Other actions
objected to on this basis include the dismissal of an unmarried teacher 59 and
an unmarried civil servant 6° for sleeping or living with a member of the
opposite sex. The other opinions in this category upheld a residential anti-
picketing ordinance on the ground that the right to privacy includes tran-
quility, protected in part by the ninth amendment; 6 ' a racially discrimina-
tory membership policy of a private country club, because associational
rights are protected privacy interests;62 upheld an indictment of a private
individual for conspiring to electronically intercept business communications
because the ninth amendment protects a bundle of unexpressed privacy in-
terests. 63 Finally, on grounds that prison overcrowding constituted severe
confinement conditions, offensive to the ninth amendment, the court ordered
a change in the prison conditions. 64
A second major category of district court cases are those in which the
courts acknowledged the ninth amendment as a source of constitutional pro-
tection for the right to privacy, but concluded that the case presented cir-
cumstances which did not involve privacy interests protected by the Gnswold
decision. Thus, the courts upheld two state statutes requiring unwed
mothers to furnish the name of the child's putative father,65 rejected a plain-
tiff's claim to an environment free from tobacco smoke,66 upheld a public
55. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 455
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1980).
56. O'Neil v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).
57. Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. N.Y. 1975). Ms. Manfredonia was ar-
rested for bringing her fourteen month old daughter to a lecture, given by William Baird, on the
subject of contraceptives. She was charged under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1974)
which makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to endanger the welfare of a child.
58. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated mem., 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.
1977),af'g 441 F. Supp. 1247 (6th Cir. 1977),dtsmissed, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1829 (1980).
59. Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), a~fd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. Mindel v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
61. People v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574 (D. R.I.), rev'd, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972).
62. Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd, 632 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1980) (since the "private" club involved was not a truly private social organization, the
court dismissed the ninth amendment argument).
63. United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
64. Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). Although the court specifi-
cally found a violation of the ninth amendment, the opinion is unclear as to the nature of the
ninth amendment right that was involved.
65. Burdick v. Miech, 385 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65
(D. Conn. 1973), acatedper curiam, 422 U.S. 391 (1975), modifiedrub noa. Doe v. Maher, 414 F.
Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976), vacatedper cuaim, 432 U.S. 526 (1977).
66. Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976),
afd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1979).
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high school's grooming code, 67 and held that the Mann Act's prohibition on
the interstate transportation of women for prostitution purposes did not vio-
late a ninth amendment guarantee to privacy.6 Other district court's have
rejected a claim that the right to privacy protected one from unwarranted
publicity,69 upheld a city ordinance prohibiting the use of the word "Sa-
loon" for any premise on which alcohol was sold, 70 and held that a New
York statutory eviction procedure did not infringe upon any " 'right to hous-
ing' within the ambit of the ninth amendment.
'7 t
In a number of environmental cases, the courts held that the right to a
clean environment was not protected by the ninth amendment. 72 The
courts made no effort in these cases to identify when the environment might
conceivably be protected by the ninth amendment. The opinions, however,
do not dispute that the ninth amendment is a source of constitutional protec-
tion for other unidentified rights.
In eight cases, the courts rejected challenges to the government impos-
ing restrictions or obligations, on the basis that the sovereign possessed the
requisite constitutional authority to impose such restrictions or obligations.
In two instances, the courts upheld the dismissal of civil servants for partici-
pating in political activities in violation of the Hatch Act. 73 A Seventh Day
Adventist's refusal to pay union dues was rejected on the ground that Con-
gress, under its power to regulate interstate commerce, could provide for col-
lective bargaining under which the "employer and the federally-employed
representative of employees . . . [could] make a collective bargain requiring
union membership."'74 A serviceman's challenge to transfer orders which
would have sent him to Vietnam, 75 and a civilian's challenge to an induc-
67. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), af'd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.
1969).
68. United States v. Ceasar, 368 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Wis. 1973), affdmem. sub noa., United
States v. Harden, 519 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1975).
69. Reilly v. Leonard, 459 F. Supp. 291 (D. Conn. 1978). Reilly filed a suit alleging that
his right to privacy had been violated when the police published an -investigative report which
concluded that he was the murderer of his mother. The report was published after the Attorney
General rejected it and an information against Reilly was dismissed with prejudice.
70. Boscia v. Warren, 359 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
71. Velazquez v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), a d 451 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1971).
72. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. N.Y. 1979);
Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D. N.J. 1978); Upper West
Fork River Watershed Ass'n v. Corps of Engineers, 414 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. W. Va. 1976), affd
me., 556 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977),cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978); River v. Richmond Metro-
politan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973), af'dper curiam 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp. 363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Virginians for Dulles
v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir.
1976); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970),afd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
73. Hatch Political Activities Act, Ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 1501-1505 (1976). Democratic Cent. Comm. for Montgomery County v. Andolsek,
249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966); Fishkin v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40
(N.D. Cal. 1969), dismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970).
74. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (D. Mass. 1970), af'd, 440 F.2d 14
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
75. Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. N.Y. 1970),aj'd, 443 F.2d 1039. cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971). Orlando sought to void the orders by arguing that his rights as a citizen
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tion notice,76 were rejected, as was the challenge of a military reservist to a
requirement that he participate in a Veteran's Foreign War parade. 77 Envi-
ronmentalists seeking to prevent mining operations in the Challis National
Forest, located in Idaho, were rebuffed; the court found that Congress, and
not the citizenry, has the constitutional power to dispose of minerals in land
owned by the United States. 78 A challenge to an indictment under the
Hobbs Act 79 was also rejected by the court. 80
In three of the remaining cases, the district courts held that the asserted
rights were indeed fundamental but, under the circumstances, the state had
a more compelling interest. Consequently, the courts upheld grooming
codes for inmates,8a and for police officers,8 2 and upheld the discharge of.a
teacher for expressing, in her economics class, her opinions concerning the
issue of students' rights and corporal punishment.8 3 The final two cases,
involving a challenge to a high school grooming code,8 4 and a claim to a
protected environment,8 5 are the only ones which state that the ninth
were violated because the conduct of the war in Vietnam was not authorized by Congress and
the Executive had no constitutional authority to continue it.
76. United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
77. Jones v. United States Secretary of Defense, 346 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972). Jones
maintained that because the parade coincided with a speech that was to be delivered by then
Vice President Spiro Agnew, the parade indirectly promoted the Vice President's political can-
didacy for reelection. Jones supported the Democrats and the presidential candidacy of Senator
George McGovern.
78. Honchok v. Hardin, 326 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1971).
79. Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 793 (1948) codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1951-1955 (1976).
80. United States v. Howe, 353 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Mo. 1973). Howe was indicted for
compelling a tavern owner to provide space for various coin operated machines.
81. Howard v. Warden, Petersburg Reformatory, 348 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1972), d-
missedmem., 474 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1973).
82. Stradley v. Andersen, 349 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Neb. 1972), afd, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1973).
83. Ahern v. Board of Education, 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 399
(8th Cir. 1972). Ms. Ahern was suspended when, during class time, she criticized the action of a
substitute teacher who slapped a student. In addition, during the discussion Ms. Ahern raised
issues pertaining to students' rights. Judge Urbom argued that although Ms. Ahern had a right
to express her opinions, there is no right to express them during class in violation of a superior's
admonition not to do so when the subject of her opinion is directly related to student and
teacher discipline. Id. at 1397.
84. Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School District, 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex.
1970). Judge Allen Hannay dismissed the relevance of the ninth amendment in the following
words:
The Ninth Amendment . . . has traditionally been construed to pertain to the proper
allocation of governmental power between the federal and state sovereigns. . . . It
would be the opposite of this to ascribe to the stately 18th century rhetoric of the
Ninth Amendment an intent to enlarge at the expense of the several states the federal
judicial power created by Article III of the Federal Constitution-a judicial power
amply extended by the Fourteenth Amendment and its authoritative interpretation
across the years.
Id. at 577.
85. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd,
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). Judge Robert Taylor rejected any
contention that the ninth amendment could be invoked as a source of constitutional protection
for the area to be flooded, by pointedly stating that "the Ninth Amendment grants no substan-
tive rights." Thereafter, Judge Taylor also stated: "The Ninth Amendment simply provides
that the specification of certain rights in the Constitution shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights retained by the people." Id. at 611. Note also that Judge Taylor cited
the opinion in Tanner to support his assertion that the ninth amendment grants no substantive
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amendment affords no protection to unenumerated rights.
To summarize, in every case where the judges addressed rights which
they considered to be protected by the ninth amendment, the judges re-
stricted the protection to the general right of privacy. In most cases, the
judges only addressed the question whether the right that a plaintiff asserted
was included in the definition. The courts did this without attempting to
criticize or limit the right to privacy itself. Only Chief Judge Clarie, in Reily
v. Leonard,86 tried to define the scope of the right to privacy. According to
Judge Clarie, the right to privacy protects one "from substantive regulation
by the government"8 7 only in those areas involving "private conduct in
'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, and child rearing and education'."88 With few exceptions, the other
judges who sought to characterize an aspect of the right to privacy and
whether it is protected by the ninth amendment, restricted their identifica-
tions to aspects of privacy equivalent to or similar to those identified by
Judge Clarie. While those opinions extending ninth amendment privacy
protection to the choice of hair style or the receipt of obscene material may
not fit exactly within Judge Clarie's conception of the constitutional right to
privacy, nevertheless, according to other judges, such conduct also finds
shelter under the wings of ninth amendment privacy.
II. DISCUSSION
As this review illustrates, the federal courts have, with few exceptions,
restricted the scope of ninth amendment protection to the marital-familial
aspect of the right to privacy. Where efforts to define the scope of this right
have been made, they have generally been limited to protecting the auton-
omy of the individual, matters concerning the family and procreation, (in-
cluding marriage and contraception), and such aspects of family
relationships as child rearing and education. Other rights which are easily
distinguished from the marital-familial axis were held by the courts to be
unprotected by the ninth amendment. For example, the courts consistently
rejected contentions that the ninth amendment includes protection for a
clean environment.8 9 The courts were unwilling to extend ninth amend-
ment protection to the naming of one's tavern as one pleased,9° or to the
discussion of corporal punishment in a classroom.9 1 Moreover, the decisions
reviewed demonstrate that ninth amendment rights are not absolute; they
may be balanced against legitimate governmental interests. In addition,
courts rejected ninth amendment claims which infringed on the exercise of
other legitimate constitutional powers.
rights. In so doing, Judge Taylor interpreted the treatment of the ninth amendment claim in
Tanner expansively and erroneously. Judge Noel's ruling in Tanner concerning the ninth amend-
ment is limited to the question of environmental concerns, and not to the ninth amendment
proper.
86. 459 F. Supp. 291 (D. Conn. 1978).
87. Id. at 299.
88. Id. at 300, quoting, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
89. See supra note 70.
90. See supra note 68.
91. See supra note 81.
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Beyond these obvious conclusions lie some intriguing undercurrents
which provide portents of the future significance of the ninth amendment to
the protection of unenumerated rights. Ostensibly, Ringold's, and Rhoades
and Patula's views of the status of the ninth amendment are correct. It ap-
pears that, as Ringold has written, the "success ratio for asserted ninth
amendment rights has been so phenomenally large that an attorney would
almost be derelict if (s)he did not at least include" the ninth amendment in
her or his claim.92 This is most probably the result of the marked growth in
ninth amendment claims made since Griswold, and success of even a small
number of those actions. This also accommodates Rhoades and Patula's as-
sessment that the courts have exhibited a "reluctance" to use the ninth
amendment.9 3 The matter is obviously one of perspective. Significantly,
however, both articles ignore altogether the rationales underlying the ulti-
mate decisions of the courts. The rationale for the result in these cases indi-
cate, however, the scope of the ninth amendment's status, and its future in
the judiciary.
An overwhelming number of the cases examined do not directly address
whether, under the circumstances of each case, the ninth amendment was
properly invoked. Grzswold is the only case in which the Supreme Court
found a right, the right to privacy, and rested it squarely upon the ninth
amendment. Yet in subsequent cases involving privacy questions the Court
deliberately avoided connecting that right to the ninth amendment, holding
instead that the right was encompassed within the liberty concept of the
fourteenth amendment. Moreover, in every instance after Griswold, the
Court avoided the question of the relationship of the ninth amendment to
the constitutional scheme of fundamental rights. In effect, immediately after
the Court gave life to the right of privacy on ninth amendment grounds, the
new child privacy was placed under the aegis of the more structured and
familiar guardian "liberty," to be nurtured and cultivated. Thus, while the
right to privacy has become firmly entrenched in the American scheme of
constitutional rights, the ninth amendment basis for this right has become
relegated to limbo; it is neither repudiated nor immuted as a constitutional
source of protection. This effect is evident in many lower federal court deci-
sions. Rather than moving toward an acceptance or rejection of the ninth
amendment, the lower courts have focused on the more general question of
whether the particular right asserted was encompassed by the broader con-
cept of the right to privacy.94 This approach is illustrated by Judge Myron
Bright's opinion in Bishop v. Colaw.9 5 Judge Bright cited a number of cases
for the point that while courts found protection in the ninth amendment
right to privacy for the right to choice in governing personal appearance,
92. See Ringold, supra note 2, at 36.
93. See Rhoades and Patula, supra note 4, at 163-67.
94. This may also account for another tactic used by a number of judges in addressing a
claim of privacy based, in part, upon the ninth amendment. In these cases (not included in this
inquiry), the judges cite the ninth amendment, among others, upon which the petitioners based
their privacy claim. The judges then direct their attention to the substantive questions respect-
ing the nature of the right to privacy, and the particular claim presented, without any consider-
ation of the specific constitutional provisions from whence the right to privacy derives.
95. 450 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1970).
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others found the same protection in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and still others found it in the privacy penumbra of the Bill of
Rights. Rather than indicating a preference, Judge Bright dismissed the
need to make a choice:
A close reading of these cases reveals, however, that the differ-
ences are more semantic than real. The common theme underlying
decisions striking down hair style regulations is that the Constitu-
tion guarantees rights other than those specifically enumerated,
and that the right to govern one's personal appearance is one of
those guaranteed.
The existence of rights other than those specifically enumer-
ated in the Constitution was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Griswold. . . . Much of the present divergence of opinions as to the
source of the right asserted here can be traced to the different ap-
proaches adopted by the Justices in Griswold. We see no point in
rehashing these different approaches, since under any of them, the
conclusion follows that certain additional rights exist.
96
The current ninth amendment dilemma may be traced to the lack of
clarity in Justices Douglas' and Goldberg's opinions in Griswold concerning
the proper interpretation of the ninth amendment. 97 These questions arise:
how is the ninth amendment to be applied, and what is its relation to the
rest of the Constitution?98 Although both Justices Douglas and Goldberg
use the ninth amendment, courts and commentators disagree as to the appli-
cation and impact of that invocation. 99 Moreover, Justice Harlan and Jus-
tice White each wrote a concurrence in Griswold, in which they relied
exclusively upon the liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. With
96. Id. at 1075. This is not to suggest, however, that every judge exhibited such equivoca-
tion. Writing for the Court of Appeals in Mahoning, Judge Merritt is representative of a few
judges who expressed at least partial reliance on the ninth amendment:
In addition to formulating specific limitations on government in the first eight
amendments of the Constitution, the founding fathers in a more general way carved
out a slice of human affairs of a private nature which should be 'retained by the peo-
ple' without legislative interference. The ninth amendment provides that '[tlhe
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.'
456 F.2d at 459.
97. A number of legal commentators differ as to the proper interpretation of Goldberg's
and Douglas' opinions; this is some indication of possible ambiguities in these opinions.
98. Although this is a matter of considerable constitutional importance, satisfactory discus-
sion here is beyond the scope of this inquiry. A brief descriptive statement of each of the four
theories is set forth to provide some guidance, however: 1) the "Independent Source" theory:
the ninth amendment operates as a shield to protect unspecified, fundamental rights, just as
each of the first eight amendments directly protects the rights specified in text, 2) the "Opera-
tionalize Due Process" theory: the ninth amendment directs the courts to interpret broadly the
due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, 3) the "Enabling Analogous
Rights" theory: the ninth amendment may be invoked for the sole purpose of expanding or
protecting those rights enumerated throughout the Constitution, most particularly rights identi-
fied in the first eight amendments and, 4) the "Rule of Construction" theory: the ninth amend-
ment adds nothing in the way of substantive rights, its sole purpose being to guard against a
misconstruction of any enumerated or interpreted constitutional guarantee.
99. See, e.g. , Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wts. L. REV.
979, 982; Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten.- The
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235, 243 (1965-66); and Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The
Justices and Connectzcut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680, 686 (1966-67).
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this panoply of viewpoints before them, it is no wonder that the lower federal
courts generally remain silent on the details of ninth amendment jurispru-
dence. 00 The absence of an established form for ninth amendment adjudi-
cation has, however, proven to be less a barrier than might be expected in
justifying the final judgment of the courts. Where there was a case factually
similar to the one under consideration, which recognized a similar substan-
tive right, the examining court would follow the earlier case and recognize
the asserted right. On the other hand, where precedent was unavailable, the
courts were not inclined to extend constitutional protection. This pattern
was reflected by comments in those cases which intimated the court could
not recognize the asserted ninth amendment right because of the absence of
guiding precedent.
CONCLUSION
The courts have been willing to recognize that constitutional claims
may be based on the ninth amendment. The courts are more willing to give
ninth amendment protection, however, to matters that fall within the mari-
tal-familial aspects of privacy. Because of this hesitancy to push Griswold
beyond the family, a complete view of the breadth and depth of the ninth
amendment in the federal courts has yet to develop. The overwhelming
number of lower federal court cases examined lend themselves to the follow-
ing general assessment: A ninth amendment claim is more likely to receive
favorable judicial recognition when it is used in asserting the marital-famil-
ial form of the right to privacy. The further the ninth amendment claim is
from the marital-familial axis, the less acceptance it will receive.
If the ninth amendment is to be expanded, or explained, the responsi-
bility for doing so resides with the Supreme Court. Should the Supreme
Court choose to invoke the ninth amendment for the purpose of protecting a
particular right, lower courts will follow suit. The absence of Supreme
Court guidance has discouraged an expansive interpretation of the ninth
amendment rights by the lower federal courts.5 0t Judge Garnett Eisele's
100. Judge Cummings' opinion in United States v. Choate, is the exception. His opinion is
worth quoting at length.
The specific sources for zones of privacy in the Constitution seem only to include the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484, . . . . If a zone of privacy cannot be grounded on neutral principles rooted
in one of these constitutional sources, it simply does not enjoy constitutional protec-
tion . ..
Requiring that a constitutional right be locatable in the Constitution most em-
phatically does not, of course, suggest a strict circumscription of the various specific
constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Each guarantee still has its Griswold
penumbras and emanations. But if it is demonstrated seriatim that none of the specific
guarantees creates a zone of privacy in a given case, then there simply is not a constitu-
tional 'right of privacy' in that case. Nor is there any question of synergistic coupling
between the several Bill of Rights guarantees to create by the operation of all of them
together a constitutional right not locatable in any one of them.
576 F.2d at 173-74. See also supra notes 84 and 85.
101. Two possible additional factors inhibiting efforts by the lower courts to undertake such
an endeavor include 1) the failure on the part of the litigants to provide the courts with suffi-
cient elaboration concerning the relevance of the ninth amendment (a concern specifically
noted by some judges); and 2) the apparent lack of awareness, on the part of the judges and
justices, of the ninth amendment literature.
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opinion in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army
expresses the hesitancy of the lower federal courts to formulate new jurispru-
dence independent of Supreme Court guidance:
[Sluch claims, even under our present Constitution are not fanciful
and may, indeed, someday, in one way or another, obtain judicial
recognition. But, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Spector Motor
Sew., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944):
Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhila-
rating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may
be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant.
The Ninth Amendment may well be as important in the develop-
ment of constitutional law during the remainder of this century as
the Fourteenth Amendment has been since the beginning of the
century. But . . . the plaintiffs have not stated facts which would
under the present state of the law constitute a violation of their
constitutional rights as alleged . . . in their complaint.
0 2
This opinion intimates that lower courts are justifiably unwilling to
bring the ninth amendment from the "womb" to the courtroom without
some strong assistance from the Supreme Court. This reluctance remains in
spite of the ninth amendment's promising future. Of course, this bodes
poorly for the incorporation, at least in the near future, of novel unenumer-
ated rights through the mechanism of the ninth amendment. The federal
courts remain firm in their resolve to look to the Supreme Court for gui-
dance. The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to invoke the ninth
amendment when a more specific constitutional provision guarantees the
constitutional right at issue.
Insofar as substantive unenumerated rights are concerned, the develop-
ment of the ninth amendment has been limited. Nevertheless, the treatment
given to the ninth amendment to this date may have greater significance in
the future. So far, some federal courts have recognized that the ninth
amendment provides sustenance for unenumerated fundamental rights.
While Griswold may have sown the ninth amendment seed, it did so
without regard for the fertility or receptivity of the judicial furrows in which
it was sown. Nevertheless, the courts of appeal and the district courts have
nurtured that seed to the point where it has developed its own root system,
anchoring it into the field where fundamental rights are found.
An expansion of the ninth amendment might occur one day provided
the Supreme Court becomes convinced that such an expansion is necessary.
Ultimately, the ninth amendment's potential may not begin to be seriously
explored until such time as the Justices of the Supreme Court are confronted
with a political or judicial climate which compels them to seek out reliance
on unchartered constitutional guarantees.
0 3
102. 325 F. Supp. at 739.
103. A recent case which gives some sense of the direction in which the Court is headed with
the ninth amendment is the opinion in Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980). Only Justices White and Stevens joined in Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist registered the only dissent, while others wrote concurring opinions. Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Burger found that the right of the public and the press to attend crimi-
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nal trials is guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments and could be restricted only
upon a showing of an "overriding interest." The first amendment, Burger argued, "can be read
as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to .. .[the] explicit
guarantees [such as freedom of speech and press]." To support this contention, Justice Burger
invokes the ninth amendment, reviewing briefly the Federalists' and Anti-Federalists' debate
over the formulation of the Bill of Rights. Justice Burger concluded, in a footnote, that James
Madison's efforts to end the debate "culminate[d] in the Ninth Amendment, [and] served to
allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as
excluding others." Id. at 579, n.15. See a/so supra note 25.

